A. Theory
A.1 Expected utility model
The standard way to deal with uncertainty in a spatial voting model is to set up the utility function and form the expectation over the whole utility term, in order to understand how uncertainty enters utility. 1 Generally, a voter's policy beliefs concern the expected utility derived from both candidates. Because the quadratic norm assumes that voters are risk averse, the belief variance negatively affects the evaluation of all candidates to an equal share. This results in the expectation that for voting decisions, in which only the difference in expected utility matter, the effect of belief variance is expected to cancel out. Thus, voting probabilities are systematically influenced by the difference in distance of each candidate's platform (C 1 and C 2 ) to a voter's mean policy belief (x i ):
In this expression, only a voter's mean belief about her ideal policy platform matters. This implies that two citizens who have the same mean belief but different belief variances are expected to have the same voting probabilities. In the expect utility formulation variance in policy beliefs as the theoretical representation of inconsistent policy preferences does not influence voting decisions. Although this homogeneous effect accords with often-applied probit model in spatial voting, the result is derived from a different preference model. Arguably, the expected utility approach comes with two questionable assumptions. It is neither entirely clear where the homogeneous importance of policy distance in this model comes from, nor does the model specify how the information about the candidate enters into the expected utility. The main text presents the learning model as an more accurate description.
In order to arrive at the result presented in the above equation 4, the expectation of the utility model can be simplified by expressing policy beliefs in terms of a mean belief x i , and an additional random belief variance, centered around zero θ i ∼ N(0, σ 2
Θ i
). Following from this, we can substitute Θ i by x i + θ i , and form an expectation over the whole utility term:
is constant over different candidates. As voting probabilities are formulated in terms of the difference in utility this term is equal for the evaluation of both candidates, and as a result cancels out when analyzing the probability to vote for one of the candidates. A few further assumptions about the unobserved factors in V ik are necessary to get to a standard probit representation. As discussed, if researchers observe that a voter chooses candidate 1 over candidate 2, the expected utility plus unobserved other factors V ij = E[U ij ] + ik has to be higher than for the second candidate V i1 > V i2 . Making the assumption that the additional unobserved factors follow a normal distribution with an arbitrary error variance of .5, thus: ik ∼ N(0, 0.5), allows us to derive a probit model with difference in policy distance as the systematic component. 2 This then results in:
A.2 Learning Model
In order to cover the idea of the learning model formally, a model might suppose that a priori, a voter possesses certain information about the utility difference between candidate 1 and candidate 2 that is normally distributed around zero with some variance τ. In this modeling 2 The choice of the error variance is arbitrary and made for the purpose of simplicity. Supposing a more general variance σ would affect the importance of policy distance in the probit model, by a deviation of two times σ: β 2σ . This would not change the general implications in any meaningful way. approach, prior utility difference is depicted by a distribution P (U i1 − U i2 ) .
In the next step, candidates signal their policy platform C 1 , C 2 . The information contained in these signals about the utility difference between the candidates U i1 − U i2 , follows the difference in policy distance. If candidate 1 signals that her policy platform is the same as a voter's mean belief, and candidate 2 signals a more extreme platform, the information for the voter is that candidate 1 will yield considerable higher utility. However, although the candidates' signals are perfect, the information about utility is not, because voters themselves are uncertain about their ideal policy outcome. 
) results in the following:
The likelihood is normally distributed around the difference in quadratic loss of the candidates signaled positions (C 1 and C 2 ) to a voter's mean policy belief x i . 3 Of special concern is the variance term:
. What can be seen from this expression is that the variance depends on a voter's belief variance. For voters with consistent policy preferences, the variance is smaller, which makes the signals more informative. For voters with a wider belief variance, the information in the signal is weaker.
Voters can use the information contained in the signals to update their prior utility difference, addressing the question of what the utility difference is given the platform signals
Supposing that voters form this expression employing Bayesian updating implies that the posterior beliefs are proportional to the prior and the likelihood 3 Here are the intermediate steps to get to this expression.
Because θ i is a random variable the whole expression is a random variable as well. The expectation of this expression is equal to the first part −β (C 1 − x i ) 2 − (C 2 − x i ) 2 , because the expectation of θ i is zero. The variance of the expression is constructed from the second part which is normal (because θ i is normal) with standard deviation of 4β 2 (C 2 − C 1 ) 2 σ 2
As left-hand side terms are normal, the posteriori is then the mixture between two normal distributions. What matters for vote choice (because voters employ expected utility) is the expectation of this posterior. As a mixture, the expectation will lie between the expectation of the prior and the expectation of the likelihood.
Because I suppose that the prior is centered around zero, the posterior expectation will lie between zero and expectation of the likelihood. Depending on degree of information in the signals, which is affected by the variance term, this will be closer to zero, or closer to the expectation from the likelihood. The complete posterior distribution can be derived to be normal, according to:
For which the expectation of the posterior can be formulated in the following way:
Please note that the weights
. Voting probabilities are then formulated given the expected difference in utility plus unobserved factors, resulting in a similar probit representation as in equation 4.
B. Measurement of policy platforms
The factor loadings for respondents and candidates are extracted based on 8 policy issues included in the ANES of 2008 in wave 10. All of the policy questions first ask respondents if they are in favor of, or opposed to, a specific proposition, afterwards asking them about the strength of their attitudes. In total, this creates a seven-point scale. The exact wording of the propositions are:
• Favor or oppose constant amendment to ban gay marriages
• Favor or oppose raising taxes on incomes over 200k/yr
• Favor or oppose government should pay drugs for low income seniors
• Favor or oppose government payment for all health care
• Favor or oppose suspend habeas for terror suspects
• Favor or oppose court order to wiretap terror suspect Based on the factor loadings, respondents' factor scores are extracted using regression based methods. Higher values generally indicate more liberal attitudes. As figure 1 shows the resulting distribution has longer tails to the left. The factor scores are employed to measure each respondent's mean policy belief. As such, they highly correlate with respondents self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale (-0.62) and a respondent's party identification (0.6). Obama's mean platform is located at 0.54 while McCain's platform is at -0.92.
C. Measurement of inconsistency

C.1 Estimation of inconsistency
In this section, I describe the measurement of inconsistency and policy belief variance in more detail. Increased belief variance should result in more randomness when relating answering patterns to policy platforms. This varying randomness can be approximated by the amount of predictive error when relating respondents' preferences for multiple policy issues to their ideological platforms. Following this line of thought, respondents' attitudes towards specific proposals p ij can be expressed as a linear function of their beliefs Θ i over policy platforms.
where b j and a j are issue specific parameters, and ij is random measurement error, distributed normally with item specific variance of σ 2 j . 4 The policy beliefs are normally distributed according to the theoretical specification (see equation 1 in the main text). Given that respondents answer attitude questions according to standard survey response models (Zaller, 1992; Schuman and Presser, 1996) , in which respondents sample from their beliefs when answering survey questions, the specification naturally results in an additional source of randomness in answering policy issues used above are estimated. In order to integrate this source of randomness into the model, we can rewrite the beliefs
This expression can be substituted in the above p ij = a j + b j x i + b j θ i + ij , which shows that answering patterns are expressed as a function of a respondent's mean policy belief and two sources of randomness: measurement error ( ij ) and belief variance (θ i ). From this it follows that policy views can be expressed in terms of independent normal distributions with different variance terms:
The aim of this enterprise is to obtain estimates of σ 2 Θ i -or at least an estimate that orders respondents according to their inconsistency. As the latter is simpler, I substitute b 2 j σ 2
. Suppose a j , b j and x i are given, a simple estimate of σ * i is constructed based on maximum likelihood framework. The log-likelihood function of a respondent's answering patterns over J policy-questions is lnL σ
The maximum of likelihood function can be obtained by setting the first derivative to zero. Which yields (similar to the error-variance in linear model) the average sum of squared errors as the maximum likelihood estimate for σ * i :
This term can be calculated based on estimates of b j , a j and a measurement of x i . As stressed in the main text, for respondents' mean policy belief x i the self-placements on a liberalconservative scale are employed. 5 The item parameters are obtained by running simultaneous linear regressions of self-placements on policy attitudes. Based on each respondents residuals from these regressions, I calculate the mean sum of squared errors as the main measurement of inconsistency.
C. Table 4 : Results of auxiliary regressions to construct the measurement of inconsistency
The measurement of inconsistency relies on auxiliary regressions that capture the randomness when relating respondents liberal-conservative self-placement to their policy attitudes.
The results of the auxiliary regressions are reported in table 4. Again, all issues are coded in a way that higher values indicate more liberal positions, which is confirmed by the coefficients of the regression. Only for the issue whether the government should pay for drugs for low income seniors' do we find no statistically significant effect. Based on the residuals from the regressions, the estimate of σ * i as the average sum of squared errors is calculated. Figure 3 shows the resulting distribution of inconsistency. 
C.3 External validity of inconsistency measurement
This section highlights that the measurement of inconsistency is related to education and political interest. The conceptualization of inconsistency is based on the behavioral models of mass belief systems. In those theories, the varying degree of ideological constraint is influenced by the exposure to public debate and thereby strongly related to measurements of political sophistication. One way to validate the measurement is than to see in how-far political sophisticated voters also posses higher levels of inconsistencies. The American National Election Study contains two questions that are frequently used as a measurement of political sophistication: Education level and how interested a respondent is in politics. Table 6 : Parameter estimates for policy-weighted probit model with positions from factor model as a measurement of policy distance Figure 5 and figure 6 show the marginal interaction effect at different predicted probabilities to vote for Obama. The marginal interaction effect is strongest amongst respondents with medium probability to vote for Obama. The following gives a brief summary of the robustness checks, with more detailed descriptions, tables and results in the following sections.
• To check if these results are robust to the measurement strategy employed in the proceeding analysis, I estimate the models using different measurement of policy platforms.
As a second measurement of policy platforms, the analysis relies on self-placements on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale. The model is again estimated f the quadratic distance of a respondent's self-placement to the perceived candidates' platforms on the same scale, as well as the distance to the average placement of the two candidates. The results are confirmed for the distance using average candidates' platforms: Inconsistency moderates the effect of policy distance. In the model specification with perceived platforms, the interaction effect is negative but not statistically significant. This does not directly conclude that policy distance in this case is not moderated by varying degrees of consistency, as the marginal interaction effect can still be significant for a certain share of respondents. But it clearly hints in the direction that employing mean platforms reveals a different pattern than the one found when using perceived positions. One apparent reason for this is perception biases which can be expected to be especially strong when employing single item measurements. Respondents who are classified as holding inconsistent policy preferences, still place the candidate they intend to vote for closer to their self-placement.
The results are reported and discussed more closely in section E.1
• Moreover, as an alternative measurement of inconsistency, the standard deviation of self- However, only when employing measurements on the liberal-conservative scale, are the interaction effects statistically significant. The size of the interaction effect is about equal to the main results, in this the insignificance might be only due to the decreased number of observations when relying on factor sores (around 430 instead of 1010). Section E.2
reports the estimation results in more detail.
• Additional concerns with the analysis might be related to the measurement of inconsistency. First, the developed measurement of inconsistency as the sum of squared errors is an estimate itself which could result in considerable biases in estimating the model. to unique combinations of social pressures on separate issues, but still be very certain about those issues. Section E.4 reports that the moderating effect is particularly strong among the respondents with rather weak policy views. For voters with a strong attitudes, the moderation is similar to the on the full sample, showing that the mechanism works for both groups. In addition, the inconsistency measurment might be influenced by specific issues that do not map on the liberal conservative self-placment. Section E.5 describes that leaving out single issues from the measurment of policy distance and inconsistency results in the similiar conclusions. Finally, some readers might suspect that the conceptualization of inconsistency simply equates to voters with moderate platforms. Section E.6 argues that while those are empirically linked, moderate platforms do not offer an alternative explanation for the moderating effect of inconsistencies on spatial voting.
Additional to the set of robustenss check the results are further found in the 2012 presidential elections, as section F outlines.
E.1 Results using liberal-conservative scale
This section reports estimates for the policy-weighted model relying on a liberal-conservative scale.Respondents' self-placements and candidate positions are used to create a measurement of policy distance to the mean candidate platform and the perceived platform. The results are reported in table 11. Models 5 and 6 report the estimates for the perceived distance measurement. Models 7 and 8 use the distance to the mean platform. In all specifications, negative quadratic distance has a positive effect on the probability to vote for Obama.
The effect of policy distance is moderated when employing distance to the mean platform, shown by the negative interaction effect in Model 8 and the increasing Likelihood in comparison to Model 7. Increasing inconsistency decreases the effect policy distance has on expected utility.
In the case of perceived positions, the interaction effect is not significantly different from zero. All interaction effects are negative -indicating that with increasing variation of self-placements the marginal effect of policy-distance decreases. However, only for Model 9 and Model 10, which uses a liberal-conservative scale to calculate policy distance, are the interaction effects significant. The estimates for the control variables are not reported in the and Model 14 the perceived distance (which replicates Model 2). The effect of policy distance as well as the interaction effect with inconsistency, is slightly smaller compared to original model specifications. Nonetheless, the main results do not change. The interaction effect in both models is still statistically distinguishable from zero, with a mean three times as high as the standard deviation. The effect of policy distance is, thus, moderated by inconsistency even when considering the uncertainty that arises from the measurement.
E.4 Heterogeneity between different types of inconsistency
There are two types of respondents that the measurement picks up as having inconsistent policy preferences: Respondents who posses weak attitudes towards the policy proposals and respondents who have a crystallized mix of strong liberal and strong conservative attitudes.
One might argue that for two groups, the mechanism works quite differently. In order to test this set of supposition, the following analysis splits the sample in two, and re-estimates the models from the main text. figure 12 . The voting decisions are taken from the post election survey wave to estimate the policy-weighted model. "For whom did R vote for President in 2012?" (presvote2012 x).
Standard controls (party identification, age, education, Catholic, African-American and income) are further included. cases the interaction effect model fits the data considerably better and the interaction effect is negative, indicating decreasing marginal effects. These results can also be seen in figure 10 which plots the marginal effect of policy distance for different levels of consistency. There is clear decreasing marginal effect: Those with inconsistent policy preferences put less weight on policy. 
